Refining shippers’ dyadic cost, risk, and delivery responsibilities: The principal changes to INCOTERMS and a transaction cost focus for the future by Stapleton, Drew M et al.
Journal of Transportation Management
Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 3
1-1-2014
Refining shippers’ dyadic cost, risk, and delivery
responsibilities: The principal changes to
INCOTERMS and a transaction cost focus for the
future
Drew M. Stapleton
University of Wisconsin La Crosse, astapleton@uwlax.edu
Vivek Pande
University of Wisconsin La Crosse, vpande@uwlax.edu
Soumen Ghosh
Tennessee State University, sghosh@tnstate.edu
Uzay Damali
University of Victoria, udamali@uvic.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/jotm
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, and the Transportation
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Transportation Management by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Stapleton, Drew M., Pande, Vivek, Ghosh, Soumen, & Damali, Uzay. (2014). Refining shippers’ dyadic cost, risk, and delivery
responsibilities: The principal changes to INCOTERMS and a transaction cost focus for the future. Journal of Transportation
Management, 24(2), 7-29. doi: 10.22237/jotm/1388534520
Spring/Summer 2013
7
THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIRLINE PROFITABILITY
AND PASSENGER SATISFACTION
Kent N. Gourdin
College of Charleston
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the ongoing evolution of the U.S. airline industry under deregulation.  After
losing money for most of the past 35 years, carriers have made structural changes to their business
models that have proven to be, at least in the short term, very profitable.  After delineating these
management actions, the paper examines their impact on passengers.  The author utilizes the Service
Quality Model to analyze the long-term implications of this new operating paradigm for passenger
satisfaction.  Based on this analysis the paper goes on to suggest several actions management could
take to improve satisfaction.  Finally, conclusions are offered and areas for additional research
suggested.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. airline industry has been in a state of
instability since 1978.  Deregulation, for better
or worse, put the business of air transportation
back into the hands of managers who were, after
years of government regulation, free to decide
what routes to serve, what fares to charge, and
how best to meet the needs of their passengers
while (hopefully) earning a profit.  As the
ensuing decades proved, the free market can be a
tough place for an airline to survive in, let alone
prosper.  The 1980s saw a flood of new airlines
entering the industry, often competing with the
established (or legacy) carriers solely on the
basis of low fares.  By the latter part of the
decade and into the 1990s, many firms realized
that low price was difficult to sustain as a firm’s
only competitive advantage.  Companies began
failing in large numbers as the legacy carriers
learned to leverage their route structures and
higher service levels to attract passengers while
selectively lowering prices to compete with new
entrants.  Unfortunately, the inability to adapt to
an open market also quickly claimed some of the
nation’s oldest airlines:  Braniff International in
1982, Western Airlines in 1986, and both Eastern
and Pan Am in 1991.
The business environment became even worse in
the 2000s as carrier managers were forced to
deal with rising fuel, security, and general
operating costs while confronting an extremely
price-sensitive customer base demanding the
impossible:  low fares and high service levels.
As shown in Table 1, the volatility in annual
industry earnings from 2000-2011 was
staggering.
However, by 2009 there were clear signs that
U.S. airlines had made structural changes to
their business models that could very well signal
a permanent turnaround in their fortunes.  After
delineating these management actions, this paper
will examine their impact on passengers
utilizing the Service Quality Model (Zeithaml,
Berry and Parasuraman, 1985) to look at the
long-term implications of this new operating
paradigm for passenger satisfaction.  Finally,
conclusions will be drawn and areas for
additional research suggested.
A NEW REALITY
This section of the paper reviews a number of
management actions that have shaped the
industry since deregulation, and the impact of
those actions on passengers.
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TABLE 1
OPERATING PROFIT/LOSS FOR U.S. CARRIERS 2000-2011
Year Operating Profit/Loss
(Thousands of Dollars)
2000 7,014,004
2001 -10,318,784
2002 -8,565,745
2003 -2,092,538
2004 -1,489,673
2005 447,623
2006 7,639,841
2007 9,343,743
2008 -3,350,129
2009 2,334,971
2010 10,516,933
2011 7,121,315
Source: Research and Innovative Technology Administration
Bureau of Transportation Statistics F41 Schedule P12 Data
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements_Financial.aspx?Data=6
Management Actions
Management actions that have been stood out in
recent years are discussed next and could be
grouped into categories that include mergers,
fees, flight reductions, fares, and fuel costs.
Mergers
While airline mergers have been common since
the beginning of deregulation, they reached a
critical mass in the past decade.  As seen in
Table 2, many of the so-called legacy carriers
that were household names in 1978 have
disappeared, either because they failed outright,
or merged with the survivors.  In fact, American
and US Airways are contemplating a union that
would arguably be the last one possible without
running afoul of anti-trust laws (Spector and
Carey, 2012).  As a result of this consolidation,
the companies have been able to impose various
fees on passengers, reduce the number of flights
and raise fares, actions that have significantly
improved their profitability but adversely
affected customers.  Each of these business
decisions will be discussed in more detail below.
Fees
The airlines have gradually imposed a myriad of
charges for amenities and services that
historically had been included in the fare, a
process known as un- or de-bundling.
Beginning with checked luggage and reservation
charges, there are fees now for booking a ticket
over the phone, reserving certain seats, boarding
an airplane early, printing a boarding pass at the
airport, and even carrying on a bag (Garrow,
Hotle and Mumbower, 2012).  The profit
potential becomes obvious after examining a
hypothetical airplane carrying 100 passengers
each paying an average domestic $146 fare
($292 round-trip) and noting how many
customers, on average, are needed to cover the
cost of the flight.  Twenty-nine people will be
required to meet fuel expenses, with another 20
covering personnel salaries; 16 passenger fares
will be allocated to ownership costs, 14 to
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TABLE 2
MAJOR U.S. AIRLINES IN 1978
Airline Current Status
American Still operating, exploring merger with US Airwaysi
Braniff Ceased operations, 1982ii
Continental Merged with United, 2010iii
Delta Still operating
Eastern Filed for Bankruptcy, 1989iv
National Merged with Pan Am, 1980v
Northwest Merged with Delta, 2008vi
Pan Am Filed for Bankruptcy, 1991vii
TWA Merged with American, 2001viii
Western Merged with Delta, 1987ix
United Still operating
(Endnotes)
i Carey, Susan.  “AMR, US Airways Talks Draw Closer,” The Wall Street Journal, September 1, 2012, p. B3.
ii http://www.braniffpages.com/syhistory.html
iii http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/breaking/chi-united-continental-pilots-vote-to-authorize-strike-
20120718,0,2280435.story
iv http://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-10/news/mn-1205_1_eastern-airlines
v http://www.nationalsundowners.com/about/history.php
vi http://www.northwestairlines.com
vii http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-08/news/mn-8037_1_united-airlines
vii http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2011/04/09/american-airlines-buyout-of-twa-completed-ten-years-ago-today/
ix http://deltamuseum.org/M_Education_DeltaHistory_Facts_Family_Tree_Western_Timetable.htm
various government fees and taxes, and 11 to
maintenance.  Nine tickets will cover “other”
costs such as catering, delivering lost bags,
rental of airport facilities, marketing, legal fees,
etc.  With 99 passengers accounted for, that
leaves only one covering profit.  Ancillary
revenue, on the other hand, supplements the
flight by $18 per person or $1800 total
(McCartney, 2012a).  The results speak for
themselves.  In the first three months of 2012,
U.S. carriers earned $816 million in baggage
fees and $631 million in reservation change fees
(Jones, 2012), all of which are imposed along
with the various government taxes and fees
collected as additions to the fare.
Flight Reductions
For years, airline managers realized they were
offering too many seats, but competitive
pressures made it impossible for any single
carrier to reduce their capacity for fear of ceding
business to a competitor.  However, industry
consolidation has reached the point where the
remaining airlines have been able to successfully
pull back on the number of flights they operate,
with a concomitant positive impact on load
factors.  As shown in Table 3, the number of
flights offered by U.S. airlines rose steadily from
2000, peaking in 2005, and then falling to their
lowest level in 2011.  Load factors, on the other
hand, have trended upward for the entire decade,
also reaching their peak at slightly over 82% in
2011.  The end result is fewer aircraft carrying
more passengers, which is good news for the
firm, a fact confirmed in a recent study by Lin
utilizing Activity-Based Costing and Data
Envelopment Analysis to illustrate the power of
lowering costs and raising load factors on
schedules services (Lin, 2012).
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TABLE 3
OPERATING DATA FOR U.S. CARRIERS 200-2011
 2000 665,486,803 8,493,297 72.33
 2001 621,369,048 8,221,751 70.00
 2002 612,777,682 8,675,945 71.78
 2003 644,234,973 10,136,163 73.46
 2004 700,230,727 10,699,663 75.48
 2005 735,104,668 10,825,881 77.64
 2006 741,098,199 10,521,442 79.23
 2007 766,626,582 10,671,436 79.93
 2008 740,460,933 10,202,004 79.54
 2009 701,164,455 9,542,320 80.41
 2010 717,744,056 9,499,044 82.07
 2011 728,351,972 9,455,032 82.10
Source:  Research and Innovative Technology Administration
Bureau of Transportation Statistics F41 Schedule P12 Data
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements_Financial.aspx?Data=6
Fares
Table 4 shows average U.S. domestic fares in
current and constant dollars from 1995-2011.  In
current terms, fares have risen 24.5% over the
period from $292 in 1995 to $364 in 2011; while
in real dollars, however, fares have actually
fallen almost 16% since 1995.  Year-to-year
fluctuations, while generally upward, have been
relatively modest with the largest annual change
a 10.4% drop in 2009.  In line with the earlier
discussion regarding industry flight reductions,
the 8.3% price increases in both 2010 and 2011
may indicate consolidation is having a positive
impact (from management’s point of view) on
prices as well.  Unfortunately, passengers are
having an increasingly difficult time determining
how and when to buy.  The proliferation of
online booking options usually beginning with
lowest price can easily confuse a buyer.  In fact,
even airline websites offer fares that, while
Year Passengers Moved
(All Airports)
Load Factor
(Passenger Miles
as a Percentage of
Available Seat-Miles)
Flights
(All Airports)
appearing low, may involve ridiculously
circuitous routings that can more than double the
elapsed time of the trip.
Fuel Costs
Coping with rising fuel costs is an on-going
challenge for carrier management and the
impetus for many of the strategic changes
already discussed.  As shown in Table 5, double-
digit year-to-year increases, both in the United
States and abroad, became the norm in 2003,
although the volatility inherent in oil prices
made managing these costs even harder.  For
example, fuel was 46% more expensive in 2008
than in 2007, but in 2009 the price fell 38% only
to rise again 18% in 2010.  Rather than
increasing fares, surcharges are often used to
recoup higher fuel costs because they can be
easily manipulated as market conditions change.
In addition, the passenger perceives that the fare
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TABLE 4
ANNUAL U.S. DOMESTIC AVERAGE ITINERARY FARE IN
CURRENT AND CONSTANT DOLLARS
 1995 292 292
 1996 277 -5.3 -5.3 269 -8.0 -8.0
 1997 287 3.8 -1.7 273 1.5 -6.7
 1998 309 7.6 5.8 289 6.0 -1.1
 1999 324 4.7 10.8 296 2.5 1.4
 2000 339 4.7 16.0 300 1.3 2.7
 2001 321 -5.4 9.7 276 -8.0 -5.6
 2002 312 -2.6 6.9 265 -4.1 -9.4
 2003 315 1.0 7.9 261 -1.3 -10.6
 2004 305 -3.2 4.5 246 -5.7 -15.7
 2005 307 .6 5.2 240 -2.7 -17.9
 2006 329 6.9 12.4 248 3.6 -15.0
 2007 325 -1.0 11.3 239 -3.7 -18.2
 2008 346 6.5 18.5 245 2.6 -16.1
 2009 310 -10.4 6.2 220 -10.1 -24.5
 2010 336 8.3 15.0 235 6.5 -19.6
 2011 364 8.3 24.5 247 4.9 -15.6
Source:  Bureau of Transportation Statistics, http://www.bts.gov/programs/economics_and_finance/
air_travel_price_index/html/annual.html
* Rate calculated using Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index.
Note:  Percent change based on unrounded numbers.
Year
Average
Fare ($)
(in Current
Dollars)
Percent
Change
from
Previous
Year
(in
Current
Dollars)
Cumulutive
Percent
Change
from 1995
(in Current
Dollars)
Average
Fare ($)
(in 1995
Dollars*)
Cumulutive
Percent
Change
from 1995
(in 1995
Dollars*)
Percent
Change
from
Previous
Year
(in 1995
Dollars*)
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TABLE 5
AIRLINE FUEL COST AND CONSUMPTION 2000-2011
(U.S. CARRIERS – SCHEDULED)
2000 13,903.7 10,810.6 .78 5,122.5 4,387.8 .86 19,026.2 15,198.4 .8
2001 13,112.1 10,024.7 .76 4,955.6 3,989.5 .81 18,067.6 14,014.2 .7
%
change
over
2000       -5.69% -7.27% -1.67% -3.26% -9.08% -6.01% -5.04% -7.79% -2.9%
2002 12,287.2 8,602.9 .70 4,571.6 3,334.8 .73 16,858.7 11,937.7 .7
%
change
over
2001         -6.29% -14.18% -8.42% -7.75% -16.41% -9.39% -6.69% -14.82% -8.71%
2003 12,417.0 10,315.4 .83 4,451.0 3,838.2 .86 16,868.0 14,153.7 .8
%
change
over
2002        1.06% 19.91% 18.65% -2.64% 15.10% 18.21% .06% 18.56% 18.5%
2004 13,380.0 15,141.2 1.13 4,764.7 5,690.7 1.19 18,144.7 20,831.9 1.1
%
change
over
2003 7.76% 46.78% 36.22% 7.05% 48.26% 38.5% 7.57% 47.18% 36.83%
2005 13,284.2 21,682.9 1.63 5,040.3 8,600.8 1.71 18,324.5 30,283.7 1.6
%
change
over
2004        -.72% 43.20% 44.24% 5.78% 51.14% 42.87% .99% 45.37% 43.95%
2006 13,019.4 25,105.4 1.93 5,220.3 10,535.2 2.02 18,239.7 35,640.6 1.9
%
change
over
2005 -1.99% 15.78% 18.14% 3.57% 22.49% 18.27% -.46% 17.69% 18.24%
2007 12,998.8 26,889.9 2.07 5,428.0 11,685.0 2.15 18,426.8 38,584.9 2.0
%
change
over
2006        -.16% 7.15% 7.32% 3.98% 10.91% .67% 1.03% 8.26% 7.16%
2008 12,469.4 37,194.9 2.98 5,508.9 17,773.5 3.23 17,978.4 54,968.4 3.0
%
change
over
2007         -4.07% 38.27% 44.14% 1.49% 52.11% 49.87% -2.43% 42.46% 46.01%
2009 11,147.4 21,168.5 1.9 5,086.6 9,514.4 1.87 16,234.0 30,682.9 1.8
%
change
over
2008       -10.60% -43.09% -36.34% -7.67% -46.47% -42.02% -9.70% -44.18 -38.18%
2010 11,056.2 24,791.7 2.24 5,246.4 11,626.7 2.22 16,302.6 36,418.4 2.2
%
change
over
2009        -.82% 17.12% 18.08% 3.14% 22.20% 18.48% .42% 18.69% 18.19%
2011 10,863.6 31,345.1 2.89 5,521.1 15,536.3 2.81 16,384.7 46,881.4 2.8
%
change
over
2010      -1.74% 26.43% 28.67% 5.24% 33.63% 26.98% .5% 28.73% 28.08%
Year/
Percent
Change
Domestic
Consump-
tion
(Million
Gallons)
Domestic
Cost
(Million
Dollars)
Domestic
Cost per
Gallon
(Dollars)
International
Consumption
(Million
Gallons)
International
Cost
(Million
Dollars)
International
Cost per
Gallon
(Dollars)
Total
Consumption
(Million
Gallons)
Total
Cost
(Million
Dollars)
Total
Cost per
Gallon
(Dollars)
Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/fuel.asp?pn=0&display=data1
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has not risen, but the price of fuel has, which is
beyond the company’s control.
Impact on Passengers
The above airline practices have had a major
impact on passengers.  These impacts are
discussed next and relate to mergers, fees, flight
reductions, and fares.
Mergers
There are now fewer U.S. airlines to choose
from, especially for overseas travel.  As the
survivors rationalize their routes and realign
their hubs, multiple stop flights are becoming
more common as passengers hopscotch from
hub to hub over what used to be a one stop trip.
Frequent Flier programs have been merged, with
negative implications for virtually everyone.
Delta Airlines, for example had three levels of
elite frequent fliers prior to their merger with
Northwest:  Silver, Gold, and Platinum.  A fourth
tier, Diamond, was added after the merger which
had the practical effect of shifting the existing
categories downward.  In addition, the sheer
number of members, especially in the lowest
elite tiers, now works against receiving an
upgrade to business class or even claiming an
award ticket (McCartney, 2012b).  On a recent
domestic flight, there were 38 coach passengers
on the wait list for a seat upgrade on a 120 seat
aircraft.  Needless to say, the chances of anyone
below Platinum receiving an upgrade were
virtually non-existent.  This dilution of their
loyalty programs should be viewed with concern
by managers, given the findings of a recent study
that frequent flier programs are strongly
associated with behavioral loyalty for business
and frequent travelers, the companies’ most
profitable customers (Dolnical et al., 2011).
Fees
Supplementary fees have arguably become the
most frustrating aspect of flying today.  The
2012 American Customer Satisfaction Index
rated airlines in the bottom three among 47
industries evaluated for customer satisfaction
(Carey, 2012).  Similarly, the JD Powers and
Associates 2012 North American Airline
Satisfaction Study found that, after two years of
consecutive industry improvements, overall
passenger satisfaction declined slightly, with
costs and fees (specifically related to baggage)
playing a key role in that reduction
(autos.jdpower.com., 2012).  Carriers have
realized the profit potential inherent in charging
for ancillary goods and services, and they have
become more creative in determining what they
can demand a fee for.  Customers have been
paying for tangibles such as food, beverages,
paper tickets, headsets, pillows and blankets for
some time.  Given that air transport is primarily
a service industry, future revenue opportunities
lie in charging for intangibles, several of which
have already been mentioned.  Other items under
consideration by various airlines include fees for
aisle and window seats, which would
significantly impact, for example, families
wanting to sit together (Mayerowitz, 2012), and
allowing passengers to pay for the privilege of
exiting the airplane early (Jones, 2012).  Indeed,
customers can be forgiven for wondering where
the upcharges will end.  One study suggested
adopting passenger weight as a major fare
determinant (Bhatta, 2012).  Given the direct
relationship between aircraft operating cost and
weight, charging a 200 pound person a higher
price than a 100 pound individual does not seem
unreasonable.  Irish low-cost carrier Ryanair has
a truly imaginative CEO who has, in the past,
suggested charging passengers to use the toilet
on-board the aircraft (Massey, 2012).  While
most critics view his comments as a publicity
stunt, such a move does not seem beyond the
realm of possibility.
There are also fees and taxes added to the ticket
price that are required by the U.S. and foreign
governments.  The total fare quoted to the
customer includes all of these and they are easily
identified if the buyer cares to see them.
Checking an economy fare from Orlando to
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Tokyo shows a base fare of $1127.40 plus
$724.90 in taxes and carrier-imposed fees for a
total charge of $1852.30.  Examining those
figures in more detail shows the carrier-levied
charges constitute $654 with the remaining
$101.90 spread out over seven various charges
imposed by the U.S. and Japanese governments.
As stated by the airline, these non-government
costs represent “Carrier-imposed surcharges
stated separately from the base fare on some
international itineraries” (Delta, 2012).  A logical
assumption would be that at least part of it is to
cover higher fuel costs, but there is really no way
to tell.
There are, from the passengers’ standpoint,
several problems with these types of fees.  First,
once they are imposed, they rarely go away.
Second, the relationship between fares and these
charges is unclear so the danger is that fares can
be raised by more than the amount needed to
cover the fee(s), essentially turning them into a
money-making proposition.  As an example, fuel
surcharges by U.S. airlines have risen 53% since
April 2011, while the price of fuel has increased
24% (Martin, 2012a).  Finally, as nations grapple
with future societal issues that embrace the
airline industry (security, emissions, economic
development, etc.), fees are likely to proliferate.
For example, the European Union’s (EU)
emissions trading system (ETS) went into effect
for airlines on January 1, 2012, and applies to all
carriers regardless of nationality operating
flights to or from Europe (Wall Street Journal
Editorial, 2011).   Delta, United-Continental,
American and US Airways immediately imposed
a $6 per round trip ticket surcharge on European
routes, although some estimates suggest that
complying with the program could cost the
airlines about 3% of the fare per passenger
(Jansen, 2012).  The airlines did not immediately
acknowledge that the $6 increase was
attributable to ETS program compliance, nor is it
explicitly reflected on any website.  Perhaps it is
included in the Carrier Imposed Surcharge
discussed earlier.
Flight Reductions
As was mentioned earlier, fewer and fuller
flights have been a direct result of industry
consolidation, a clear benefit to the carrier as
every departure is virtually guaranteed to be, for
all practical purposes, full.  However, passengers
do not typically share management’s enthusiasm
for full aircraft.  The boarding process alone
becomes more problematic and takes longer to
complete.  Because so many people want to
carry on larger bags, securing overhead storage
space becomes very important.  Most airlines
have historically required passengers to follow
some form of zone policy to smooth the
boarding process:  business class passengers go
on first, followed by those seated in Zone 1, then
Zone 2, etc.  Today, however, after business
class, there are multiple categories allowing
various elite passengers to board before even
getting to Zone 1(which used to include the elite
customers).  The inevitable result is that
overhead space fills before late-boarding
passengers can be accommodated, thus
disrupting the boarding process as they try and
figure out where to stow their bag(s).
Ultimately, some luggage must then be checked,
but the fee cannot be collected at this late stage,
so these customers do not pay when others have.
Fares
As explained earlier, there are clear indications
that fares will continue to increase:   seat
capacity has been reduced, load factors are
increasing and fuel costs remain highly unstable.
Unfortunately for management, consumers do
not really differentiate between fares and fees;
they are, for all practical purposes, one in the
same so that, to consumers, raising the latter
means the former increases as well.  As
explained earlier, Delta provides a complete
breakdown of fees which are added to a base
fare.  For a comparable route, US Airways
quotes a base fare almost double that of Delta,
but with a much smaller amount listed for taxes
and fees (US Airways, 2012).  In both cases the
total customer cost is essentially the same.  With
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upward pressure on both fares and fees,
customers should be able to tell what component
of each goes into the total cost they pay.
Summary
Clearly, airlines, like any other enterprise, must
make money in order to survive and grow.
Hopefully, managers are able to earn profits
from satisfied customers through their return
business.  After years of losing money, carriers
are profitable again and seem poised to remain
that way.  But, if the previous discussion is any
indication, virtually all of the actions taken to
turn the businesses around, while successful in
that regard, have shifted costs to passengers,
reduced value-added services, and generally
diminished the travel experience.  In the next
Journal of Transportation Management16
section, the Service Quality Model will be
introduced to evaluate the longer term
implications of these actions for both airline
profitability and customer satisfaction.
SERVICE QUALITY MODEL
Because airlines are a service industry, the
Service Quality Model depicted in Figure 1, is
useful in illustrating how customer
dissatisfaction can develop.  Ignoring the arrows,
the model represents the basic marketing
process.  That is, the chart is divided into two
parts:  customers are on the top, management on
the bottom.  Managers must first learn what
customers expect in terms of service.  Once
management understands their customers’ needs
they can put together a service mix that will
satisfy them.  The customer benefits offered by
the firm must be communicated to the buyers so
that they understand why the firm provides more
value than a competitor.  That value must then
be delivered to the customer in a way that meets
their expectations.  If the service the buyer
receives meets their expectations, then they will
be satisfied and the firm will profit.  The arrows,
or Service Quality Gaps, depicted in the model
represent potential sources of customer
dissatisfaction.  Each of these Gaps will be
explained below.
Gap 1:  Understanding Customer Needs
Gap 1 illustrates the situation when management
does not really understand their customers’
needs.  For example, managers might assume
that passengers desire an inflight amenity which,
in fact, they do not.  Either insufficient market
research has been performed or the results have
been misinterpreted.  Whatever the reason,
management cannot hope to design and deliver
quality service if they do not completely
understand what their customers want.
Gap 2:  Satisfying Customer Needs
Gap 2 opens when management does know what
their customers desire (i.e. Gap 1 does not exist)
but is unwilling or unable to satisfy their needs.
Perhaps customer expectations are too high or
the firm simply lacks the resources to adequately
meet them.  Alternatively, customers may not be
sufficiently aware of their “true” travel needs so
that their stated desires are inconsistent with
their actual requirements.  Again, the service
mix developed and offered to customers does
not meet their expectations, and dissatisfaction
results.
Gap 3- Staff-Passenger Interactions
Gap 3 is an especially troubling one because it
signifies the situation where managers know
what customers want and have developed a
high-value offering to meet those needs, but that
service is poorly delivered.  For example, the
passenger may be satisfied with the airline’s
reservation and ticketing process, but the gate
agent is rude and refuses to change a seat
assignment.  Thus, the customer is dissatisfied
with the whole encounter (see Gap 5).  Often the
difficulty is that the only carrier employee the
passenger comes into contact with is the flight
attendant, ticket agent, or customer service
representative.  If this person is upset for some
reason or simply disinterested, he or she can
undermine all of management’s best efforts to
provide quality service.
Gap 4 – Execution of Services
Gap 4 is created when the organization promises
something to the customer that is subsequently
not provided.  For example, the airline promises
that passengers will receive their checked bags
once the aircraft arrives at the destination
airport.  Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons,
bags are misrouted or lost, and do not arrive with
the customer.  While most people are reunited
with their luggage relatively quickly, passenger
resentment for this situation has increased with
the arrival of baggage fees which are typically
not refunded when a bag is mishandled,  leading
to customer dissatisfaction (Gap 5).
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Gap 5 – Performance vs. Expectations
Gap 5 is the most critical opening, because it
reflects a situation in which the service received
by customers is different than what they
expected.  The buyer is dissatisfied because their
actual experience was less than what they
anticipated.  On the other hand, the customer
may actually experience better service than what
they were prepared for, but this situation
presents its own challenges and is beyond the
scope of this paper.  Gap 5 also results when any
of the other four Gaps open.  However, Gap 5
may also open by itself.  Note that satisfactory
performance results from the interaction of
factors that the managers can control (the
interior layout of the aircraft, employees) and
those that they cannot (other customers, the
passenger’s emotional state).  Thus, a customer
flying on a crowded, noisy airplane may be
unhappy with the experience even if the service
is fine.  Similarly, a person who is unhappy,
irritated, or simply having a bad day, may be
disposed to find fault with very minor company
mistakes.
External forces (i.e. laws, governmental
regulations, weather, etc.) can also have an
impact on the level of service provided by an
airline.  For example, winter weather can disrupt
flight operations and strand passengers,
sometimes for days.  Also, new government
regulations now penalize airlines for ramp/
tarmac delays once passengers have boarded.  As
a result airlines have erred on the side of
cancelling flights whenever winter weather
threatens which has exacerbated service failures.
In addition, air traffic control requirements can
adversely impact airline performance as well.
Naturally, situations such as these can have a
detrimental impact on customer service even
though the company has no control over the
factors causing them. The challenge for
managers is to minimize the size and occurrence
of service quality gaps by understanding the
needs of customers, providing a service mix that
meets those needs better than the competition,
and constantly monitoring customer satisfaction
so that corrective action can be taken
immediately if required.
RECONCILING THE NEW AIRLINE
MANAGEMENT PARADIGM
WITH CUSTOMER SATISFACTION
Based on the financial information presented
earlier, U.S. airlines are doing better than they
have in years.  Flight reductions have led to
higher load-factors, fares are rising, and ancillary
fees are proving to be especially lucrative.  As a
result, profits are up.  However, none of these
factors are particularly appealing from the
passenger’s point of view implying less schedule
choice, more crowded airplanes, and higher
costs.  In fact, complaints filed by customers
with the U.S. Department of Transportation
against U.S. Carriers are up almost 8% for the
first five months of 2012 versus the same period
in 2011 (Airconsumer.gov., 2012).  When
viewed in the context of the Service Quality
Model, this rising level of customer
dissatisfaction represents a widening of Gap 5,
as a result of Gap 2:  i.e. managers know their
actions are unpopular with customers, but
business realities require that these steps be
taken anyway.  What, if anything, should
management do to mitigate Gap 5 and improve
overall customer satisfaction?  There are several
options.
Do Nothing
Perhaps no management action needs to be
taken.  Load factors are up, operating costs are
down, and profitability is increasing for the first
time in years.  As a result, management may see
a modest increase in the number of customer
complaints as a small price to pay for continuing
a business model that is both sustainable and
profitable.  A study by Steven, Dong and Dresner
found that market concentration moderates the
relationship between satisfaction and
profitability for the US airlines.  Carriers that
operate in concentrated markets have fewer
incentives to satisfy their customers than those
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that serve more competitive markets (Steven,
Dong and Dresner, 2012).  The latest round of
industry consolidation means customer
alternatives are reduced to a smaller number of
airlines all following similar strategies, so there
is little incentive for passengers to switch
carriers. The end result of these changes is that
market power has shifted from customers back
to managers, with all that change implies.
Realign Carrier Customer Service to Fit
Today’s Environment
There are some steps management could take to
enhance the overall customer experience.  First,
the collection of fees must be streamlined to
eliminate the passenger perception that they are
being nickeled-and-dimed to death.  The reality
is that customers find some fees reasonable
(priority boarding, preferred seating, upgrades
and WiFi) while viewing others (checked
baggage) as just the opposite (McCartney,
2012c).  Airlines should consider re-bundling
some charges into a passenger service fee that
everyone pays, similar to what hotels have
instituted in the form of a resort fee to cover
telephone, internet, fitness center, etc.  For an
airline, such a fee could cover one checked bag,
entertainment, snacks, perhaps internet, but
every passenger would pay the fee.  There would
probably be initial customer dissatisfaction, but
the managers could mitigate this resistance by
offering enough bundled value that passengers
felt like they were getting something even
without checking a bag.  Furthermore, the
presence of a relatively fixed fee would
eliminate uncertainty and the feeling of
constantly being asked to pay for something.
Resort fees that are transparent and fully
disclosed prior to check-in have been have been
accepted by customers as preferable to multiple
charges for individual items.  The airlines could
find the same thing happens with a passenger
service fee.
Second, baggage simply must be managed better.
The implementation of fees for checked luggage
forced more bags into the cabin, slowing both
the security screening and aircraft loading
processes.  If everyone paid the passenger
service fee as discussed earlier, perhaps the
amount and size of carry-on items would
decrease.  While the company might experience
an increase in the quantity of checked bags, they,
along with most airports, already have the
infrastructure in place to absorb them.  In
addition, size and weight limits for cabin bags
need to be enforced prior to boarding and
preferably before security.
Third, fare transparency should be improved.
Vague explanations regarding surcharges, taxes
and fees need to be eliminated in favor of full
disclosure regarding the true cost of a ticket.
Spirit Airlines was sued in August 2012 for
collecting a passenger usage fee ranging from $9
to $17 per flight segment that appeared to be an
officially imposed charge but was, according to
the lawsuit, a scheme to collect more money
from passengers while advertising a low base
fare (Martin, 2012b).  Surcharges are especially
worrisome because they are intended to be
temporary and typically are applied by the
carrier.  In theory, these should decline or
disappear altogether once they are no longer
needed to deal with a specific situation.  In the
absence of clarity, the risk to the customer is that
these charges become permanent.
Finally, a system should be developed to allow
for the immediate on-board reporting of
passenger-related aircraft problems.  As flights
are reduced and older aircraft are retired, those
that remain are flying more.  For example, an
aircraft might depart from Atlanta for a flight to
Amsterdam where it stays for a few hours before
flying on to New Delhi.  After turning around
there, it returns to Amsterdam before continuing
back to Atlanta where it is turned back around to
make the same circuit again.  A passenger
confronted with a reading light that does not
work, a seat that does not recline, or worst of all,
a defective entertainment system, is likely to be
stuck with that situation for the duration of their
flight because higher load factors mean less
opportunity to change seats. The passenger
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might advise a flight attendant of the deficiency,
but, realistically speaking, there is really nothing
they can do other than document the issue in the
hope that it will be taken care of at some point.
Given the short turn-around times and the lack
of comprehensive maintenance support available
at en-route stops, the likelihood is that multiple
passengers will be dissatisfied as a result of what
should be a relatively minor problem.  If the
aircraft is turned as quickly at its domestic
domicile (where maintenance activities are
presumably concentrated), the problem may
remain unresolved for a lengthy period of time,
resulting in a number of dissatisfied customers.
Given the prevalence and sophistication of
inflight entertainment systems, passengers
should be able to register seat-specific
complaints that can be (a) viewed immediately
by flight service personnel in case there is
something they can do to remedy the problem,
and (b) sent via aircraft systems directly to
maintenance personnel on the ground if in-flight
correction is impossible.
A Balanced Approach
Earlier research (Gourdin and Kloppenborg,
1991) found that, up until deregulation,
passengers and managers tended to agree on
what constituted quality airline service.  As a
result, customers were satisfied and the airlines
were profitable.  After 1978, customers became
very price sensitive, demanding the high service
levels they were used to together with extremely
low fares.  Managers focused on cutting costs in
order to compete in a free-market environment,
which meant paring down services.  This
polarization at opposite ends of the quality
spectrum generated passenger dissatisfaction
that persisted for 30 years.   But the recent
events discussed in this paper have forced
passengers to redefine their expectations to fit
the new reality, presenting airline managers with
an opportunity they must not squander by doing
nothing.   The suggestions made in the above
section would go a long way towards improving
the customer experience at relatively little cost to
the company.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER
RESEARCH
The U.S. airline industry has experienced more
structural changes in the last five years than at
any time since deregulation occurred in 1978.
Because passenger expectations for air service
quality remained locked in the halcyon days of
the 1950s and 1960s, managers were unable to
reconcile customer demand for high levels of
service and low fares with the economic realities
of competing in a free market.  As illustrated
with the Service Quality Model, customer
dissatisfaction was the result as were decades of
money-losing airline operations.  Recent
industry consolidation has reduced the number
of competitors and forced passengers to modify
their service expectations, which has been good
news for managers.  As the latter move to
improve their respective bottom lines, they need
to ensure that they don’t alienate their
customers.  This paper offers executives several
options for improving customer satisfaction
while continuing to enhance profitability, a
seemingly unattainable goal before now.
Additional investigation into customer price
sensitivity would be invaluable in determining,
for example, what amount makes sense for a
passenger service fee and to identify new service
offerings that people will pay for.  One
successful innovation is the enhanced economy
seating options now being offered by some
carriers to those who are willing to pay extra for
a bit more legroom and seat comfort on long
flights.  Perhaps similar revenue opportunities
exist in offering improved dining options to
coach passengers as well.   Additional research
into buyer behavior would also be useful in
helping managers understand what they can
charge for and what they cannot, knowledge
especially useful for a carrier with extensive
overseas routes.
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